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Abstract: In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the 
Treatise (“Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses”), Hume does not think 
that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume’s position on ob-
jects (whatever that may be) is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. 
Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, 
evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. 
This paper presents the first detailed analysis of this evolution, which includes 
an explanation of T 1.4.2’s four-part system.
1. introduction
What, exactly, does Hume think an object is in 1.4.2 of the Treatise?1 Are they 
to be identified with impressions? Are they mind-independent things? Instru-
mental constructions? I certainly can’t give a comprehensive answer to all these 
questions here—space does not permit. But I can answer “no” to the second 
question: Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. And so, his 
position is not to be conflated with what he refers to as the “vulgar” (i.e., the 
everyday person’s) perspective on objects. However, by his own admission, he, 
like everyone else, did entertain the vulgar view at one point in his thought 
process, although very briefly.
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To show that this is the case, I present a careful analysis of T 1.4.2.31–41 (SBN 
201–8)2—the passages in T 1.4.2 where Hume explains the vulgar perspective at 
length. Moreover, and equally importantly, in the course of showing that Hume 
clearly distanced himself from the vulgar perspective, I show that Hume thought 
that it is actually split into two parts, where the first, or what I call vulgar perspective 
I, evolves into the second, or what I call vulgar perspective II. This evolution occurs 
because, as we will see, vulgar perspective I falls prey to a reductio. Additionally, 
and not coincidentally, we see that the distinction between vulgar perspective I 
and II directly corresponds to, respectively, part 2 and part 3 of Hume’s “four-part” 
system on the nature of identity (T 1.4.2.26–32; SBN 199–209), offering further 
evidence that he distinguished between two different ways in which the vulgar 
(but not Hume) conceived of objects.
In short, I think that this paper breaks new ground in Hume scholarship by 
showing that, 1) Hume’s position on objects must not be conflated with the vulgar 
perspective, 2) Hume clearly thought that the vulgar entertained two approaches 
to understanding objects, and 3) To properly understand Hume’s account of the 
vulgar, we must explicitly expose the structure of Hume’s four-part system, par-
ticularly parts two and three. To my knowledge, no scholar has effectively shown 
1), 2), nor carefully addressed 3).3
2. General overview of t 1.4.2
Before we delve into the analysis of Hume’s account of the vulgar, it would be 
helpful if I begin with a general sketch of T 1.4.2. Although space does not allow 
me to defend the following outline in detail, it is, for the most part, not overly 
controversial, and so, I think, may stand on its own.
The general structure of 1.4.2 may be parsed as follows: [1] Hume first estab-
lishes that his project in this section is not metaphysical, assuring us that he will 
not attempt to give an argument for or against the existence of objects, or what 
he refers to here as “bod[ies]” (T 1.4.2.1; SBN 187). He immediately begins by 
outlining what he thinks a properly conceived-of object is—or in other words, an 
object that Hume refers to elsewhere as having a “perfect identity”4—and then 
proceeds to explain why and how we might believe in such a thing. In particular, 
in T 1.4.2.2 (SBN 187–8) Hume claims that a properly conceived-of object must 
have the properties of continuity and distinctness,5 where, he claims, if we think 
that continuity obtains of an object we will naturally think that distinctness ob-
tains of the same object and vice versa (T 1.4.2.2; SBN 188). [2] Hume then asks: 
What could be responsible for our belief in objects that admit of continuity and 
distinctness? Is it a) the senses, b) reason, or c) the imagination? Or as Hume puts 
it: “[we] shall consider, whether it be the senses, reason, or the imagination, that 
produces, the opinion of a continu’d or distinct existence” (T 1.4.2.2; SBN 188). [3] 
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Hume proceeds to dismiss a) the senses in the course of T 1.4.2.3–13 (SBN 188–93) 
and b) reason on T 1.4.2.14 (SBN 193). By default, Hume immediately concludes 
that the imagination must be responsible for our notion of objects that admit of 
continuity and distinctness (T 1.4.2.11; SBN 192). [4] Accordingly, in the course 
of T 1.4.2.15–24 (SBN 194–9), Hume discusses how the imagination is responsible 
for objects that admit of continuity and distinctness in terms of a discussion of 
“constancy and coherence.” [5] Immediately following, Hume launches into his 
four-part system, where this system serves to elaborate not only why and how the 
imagination is responsible for giving us our ideas of objects that admit of continu-
ity and distinctness, but also to explain two attempts to attribute these properties 
to objects that either a) fail (i.e., the vulgar perspective) or b) come to the wrong 
conclusion about objects; particularly, that they are not imagined, but are mind-
independent (i.e., the philosophical perspective). More specifically, part 1 consists 
of a discussion of his principium individuationis (T 1.4.2.26–30; SBN 200–1). Here, 
Hume moves from discussing a properly conceived-of object in terms of admitting 
of continuity and distinctness to an object that must admit of invariability and 
uninterruptedness.6 In part 2, he dismisses, as I explain below, one aspect of the 
vulgar perspective (T 1.4.2.31–6; SBN 201–5), that is, what we may refer to as vulgar 
perspective I. Meanwhile, as I also explain below, part 3 consists of a dismissal of 
still another aspect of the vulgar perspective (T 1.4.2.36–40; SBN 205–8), that is, 
what we may refer to as vulgar perspective II. Part 4 consists of a discussion of how 
and why we might believe in the vulgar perspective (T 1.4.2.41–2; SBN 208–9). [6] 
Finally, the remainder of 1.4.2 consists of a somewhat lengthy discussion of the 
philosophical reaction to the vulgar (T 1.4.2.43–57; SBN 209–18).7
3. a General overview of the Vulgar Perspective: evidence that this 
is not Hume’s Position
With the general structure of T 1.4.2 in mind, we may now turn to a more detailed 
discussion of Hume’s account of the vulgar perspective, particularly, parts 2 and 
3 of his system, noted above in [5].
According to Hume, the every-day human being—namely, the non- 
philosopher, which includes all of us at least some of the time (T 1.4.2.36, 38; SBN 
205, 207)—is consistently duped into thinking that certain resembling sense- 
impressions may be identified with each other such that when taken as respective 
wholes, they constitute the objects of the world. This somewhat pedestrian way 
of thinking may be understood as follows: If I look at, say, a motorcycle, at time T1, 
then again at time T2, and still again at time T3–Tn, my current sense perceptions 
and my past impressions8 of the motorcycle would all appear to significantly re-
semble each other. As such, they appear to be what Hume also has occasion to refer 
to as “constant” (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 201), or “invariable” (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 202). As a 
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direct result, Hume claims that I would naturally (albeit mistakenly) be inclined 
to believe that all of these resembling sense impressions are, in fact, not only 
“identical” with each other, but in fact, they constitute the motorcycle. They are 
the “object” motorcycle. So, according to the vulgar perspective, the motorcycle 
is what I see, or alternatively, what I touch, or what I smell, or what I hear, or perhaps 
even what I taste, or finally, any combination of what I might sense. But this is not 
to say that the vulgar acknowledge, or even recognize their claim that objects are 
sense impressions. Rather, the vulgar simply do not distinguish between percep-
tions and mind-independent objects. In this respect, the vulgar perspective comes 
about reflexively, that is, without much, if any, reflection.9
Having explained that mistakenly identifying sets of sense impressions as 
objects constitutes our most natural, and so, most unreflective and vulgar attempt 
to understand the world, Hume announces: “I now proceed to . . . shew why the 
constancy of our perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect numerical iden-
tity, tho’ there be very long intervals betwixt their appearance, and they have only 
one of the essential qualities of identity, viz. invariableness” (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 201–2; 
my emphases). Our natural but prosaic attempt to understand the world is bound 
to fail. This is because it produces a notion of an object that lacks one of the “es-
sential qualities of identity” that must be associated with what Hume takes to be 
a properly-conceived of (imagined) object (recall section 2[5] above). This missing 
“essential quality of identity” is the property of “uninterruptedness” or continuity 
(T 1.4.2.30, 37; SBN 201, 205–6).
To best explain how and why this phenomenon is so naturally pervasive, 
Hume finds it appropriate to “adopt” the vulgar perspective for approximately 
the next seven pages (up to T 1.4.2.43; SBN 209). As a result, the reader must be 
extremely careful not to confuse Hume’s position with the vulgar perspective here. 
Rather, it is clear that he is merely pretending to appropriate the vulgar perspective 
to present it in as accurate a fashion as possible—if only to show why the vulgar 
are compelled to adopt it in the first place and why it amounts to a reductio. In fact, 
he could not be much clearer in this regard: “That I may avoid all ambiguity and 
confusion on this head, I shall observe, that I here account for the opinions and 
belief of the vulgar with regard to the existence of body; and therefore must entirely 
conform myself to their manner of thinking of expressing themselves” (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 
202; my emphases).
Hume immediately proceeds to explain that as part of his vulgar charade, 
he will assume that sets of resembling sense impressions are indeed, to be identi-
fied with objects, giving himself pedestrian license to use the words “object” and 
“perception” interchangeably. Doing this underlines the vulgar assumption that 
there is no distinction to be made between objects and perceptions where, as noted 
above, according to the vulgar perspective, the latter consist of sense impressions (T 
1.4.2.31; SBN 202). Moreover, reminding us still again that he is merely pretending 
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to adopt the vulgar’s perspective, he assures us that he will tell us when he stops 
doing so; making it still clearer that we should not confuse Hume’s characteriza-
tion of the vulgar perspective with Hume’s actual position, regardless of how we 
might interpret the latter: “I shall be sure to give warning, when I return to a more 
philosophical way of speaking and thinking” (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 202; my emphases). 
Already then, contrary to many scholars, including, at least, H.H. Price, Jonathan 
Bennett, Barry Stroud, Fred Wilson, Marjorie Grene, and to some degree, Norman 
Kemp Smith and Eric Steinberg,10 I think that I have justified the first claim of this 
paper: Hume is clearly not presenting his own position here (regardless of what the 
reader may take that to be), but instead, the vulgar perspective. Having established 
this, let us now turn to examining exactly how Hume defines the vulgar perspec-
tive, beginning with what I characterize as vulgar perspective I.
4. Vulgar Perspective i: Seduced by Resemblance
4.1. Dispositions
4.1.1 A General Overview
Immediately after distancing himself from the vulgar perspective, Hume turns 
his attention to the relation of resemblance. As already suggested above, he is 
certain that it is this relation that so endemically lures the unthinking lot of us 
into identifying sense impressions with objects. Naturally then, the question that 
Hume wants to answer is: How and why could resemblance have such a profound 
and far-reaching effect on the unreflecting mind? (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203). To answer 
this, Hume immediately proceeds to introduce the notion of a “disposition,” a 
notion that has, I think, been conspicuously absent in most commentaries on 
T 1.4.2 (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203).11 In particular, he begins by explaining that the 
tendency to mistakenly identify the causes of resembling dispositions is behind 
our propensity to mistakenly identify resembling perceptions. And so, as far as the 
vulgar conception of objects is concerned, we are, Hume tells us, actually dealing 
with two kinds of resemblances, leading him to write in a footnote, “there are two 
relations, and both of them resemblances which contribute in our mistaking the 
succession of our interrupted perceptions for an identical object” (T 1.4.2.39; SBN 
205n1; [my emphasis]). In particular, he continues: “The first is the resemblance 
of the perceptions; the second is the resemblance, which the act of the mind in 
surveying a succession of resembling objects bears to that in surveying an identical 
object” (T 1.4.2.39; SBN 205n1; my emphases).
However, to be precise, we must realize that Hume is actually dealing with three 
kinds of resemblance here, where the first two that I list below are, respectively, the 
two that Hume notes above. As far as the third is concerned, we will examine it at 
length in the next section. However, it will be helpful to give an overview here, 
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for as Hume admits at the beginning of the footnote cited above, “[t]his reason-
ing [regarding dispositions and the relation of resemblance], it must be confest, is 
somewhat abstruse, and difficult to be comprehended”: [1] the resemblance that 
obtains between each perception in a set of successive and similar perceptions, for 
instance the resemblance that obtains between each perception in a set of similar 
and successive motorcycle perceptions. For ease of reference, we may refer to this 
kind of resemblance as Rp. [2] The resemblance that obtains between resembling 
dispositions—where, at this point in our analysis, we may simply understand a 
“disposition” as the way in which we “conceive” (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203) of an idea or 
a set of ideas. A disposition is an “act of the mind” that “survey[s]” the idea or ideas 
at hand (T 1.4.2.39; SBN 205n1). We may refer to this kind of resemblance as Rd. [3] 
The resemblance between a set of similar and successive perceptions (that is, a set 
consisting of perceptions that admit of Rp) with an idea that admits of “perfect iden-
tity” (T 1.4.2.33; SBN 203). However, important to note, this set and this idea resemble 
each other in virtue of the similar effect that they have on the mind. In particular, each 
“place[s]” (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203) the mind in similar, if not the same12 dispositions 
(namely, dispositions admitting of Rd). In turn, Hume explains, because the given 
set of (Rp) resembling perceptions and the idea of an object that admits of perfect 
identity place the mind in (Rd) resembling dispositions, we tend to “confound” (T 
1.4.2.34; SBN 203–4) the set of successive, resembling perceptions with the idea of 
an object that admits of “perfect identity.”13 This means that while in a vulgar state 
of mind, we confuse a set of resembling, successive perceptions with an idea that has 
“perfect identity” in virtue of the similar effects that they have on the mind. Or as 
Hume puts it: “whatever ideas14 place the mind in the same disposition or in similar 
ones are apt to be confounded” (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203; my emphases). We may refer 
to this third kind of resemblance as Re (where “e” stands for effect). A chart might 
help to illustrate this admittedly “difficult” and “abstruse” reasoning:
Figure 1: Three Kinds of Resemblance
Disposition 
(caused by a set 
of resembling 
perceptions)

Rd Resemblance obtains be-
tween these two dispositions 
Disposition 
(caused by idea 
that admits of 
perfect identity)
Set of Resembling 
Perceptions (Rp Re-
semblance obtains 
between each 
perception)

Re Resemblance obtains be-
tween this set of resembling 
perceptions and an idea that 
admits of perfect identity in 
virtue of the similar disposi-
tions they cause

Idea that admits of 
perfect identity
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4.1.2 Perfect Identity
With this general overview of the role of dispositions in place, let’s dig a bit deeper 
in the text—carefully analyzing this somewhat complex epistemological/psycho-
logical process in the order that Hume presents it to us in the Treatise. Not only 
will doing so fill in the general outline of dispositions that I sketched above, but 
it will also clarify another notion that has been almost completely overlooked in 
Hume scholarship regarding T 1.4.2: “perfect identity.”15
Following Hume’s lead, “we must first examine the disposition of the mind in 
viewing any object16 which preserves a perfect identity, and then find some other 
object, that is confounded with it, by causing a similar disposition” (T 1.4.2.33; SBN 
203; my emphases). But what, exactly, does Hume mean by “perfect identity?” For 
the purposes of this paper, we needn’t look very far. Rather, recall that according 
to Hume, an idea of an object that admits of the imagined properties of invari-
ability and uninterruptedness has both of the “essential qualities” of identity. Not 
surprisingly, this is precisely what Hume means by perfect identity: it is an idea of 
object which is imagined to be both invariable and uninterrupted. In fact, this is 
exactly how Hume defines perfect identity in T 1.4.6. (T 1.4.6.6; SBN 254).
So it would seem that simply by definition, perfect identity must apply to some 
non-vulgar way of looking at the world. After all, the vulgar are only capable of 
conceiving of an invariable object, not an invariable and uninterrupted object. But 
maddeningly enough, Hume tells us that the vulgar are, in fact, capable of grasp-
ing perfect identity! Recall the passage that we began this section with: “we must 
first examine the disposition of the mind in viewing any object which preserves 
a perfect identity, and then find some other object, that is confounded with it, by 
causing a similar disposition” (T 1.4.2.33; SBN 203; my emphases). Here, Hume is 
discussing the vulgar perspective, where recall, he is looking for a disposition that 
is caused when the vulgar “view” an “object”17 that “preserves a perfect identity.” 
But how is it possible that the vulgar could have an idea of perfect identity?
Hume’s answer is, I think, rather clever, although somewhat obscure: He pres-
ents an instance of perfect identity that does not contradict the vulgar opinion 
that “[our] very sensations . . . are . . . the true objects” (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 202), and 
which fits with his view that we identify our perceptions merely based on their 
“constancy” (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 201). According to Hume, when in a vulgar state of 
mind, we may grasp perfect identity only when we uninterruptedly observe what 
we take to be an object.18 This occurs when “we fix our thought on any object” (T 
1.4.2.33; SBN 203). For instance, we might just stare at a violet for some length of 
time without looking away. As a result, our impression of the violet, is, it seems, 
virtually invariable and uninterrupted.
However, this does not quite give us an idea of perfect identity. For although it 
would seem to follow that any impression or corresponding idea that we have of the 
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violet while we are “fix[ing] our thought on it,” is invariable and uninterrupted, this 
is not the case (at least initially). Rather, Hume claims, simply due to the passage of 
time, a certain discreteness obtains of the impression we “fix our thought” on and 
the idea we have of it. This occurs as time passes from “one moment to another” 
(T 1.4.2.33; SBN 203). As a result, time injects a certain interruptedness into the im-
pression and the idea at hand. For example, although one might initially assume 
that the impression and the corresponding idea of the violet are uninterrupted 
and invariable, they are not; the passage of time ruins everything.19
But the imagination saves the day: “When we fix our thought on any object, 
and suppose it to continue the same for some time; ‘tis evident we suppose the 
change to lie only in the time, and never exert ourselves to produce any new 
image or idea of the object” (T 1.4.2.33; SBN 203; my emphases). In these rare 
vulgar cases where we “fix” our attention on an object without any apparent inter-
ruption (e.g., looking away), we naturally “suppose,” or in other words, imagine 
that the “object” is continuous, thanks to the prima facie continuity, that is, the 
uninterruptedness of the sense perception at hand. This means, consistent with 
the vulgar perspective that what we sense is indistinguishable from the objects of 
the world, the prima facie continuity (uninterruptedness) of the sense perception 
at hand is, we “suppose,” identifiable with the continuity (uninterruptedness) of 
the “object.” Or, as Hume puts it immediately after the passage cited above: “The 
faculties of the mind repose themselves in a manner, and take no more exercise, 
than what is necessary to continue that idea, of which we were formerly possest, 
and which [as such, thanks to these faculites] subsists without variation or inter-
ruption” (T 1.4.2.33; SBN 203; my emphasis). That is, the “faculties” of the mind, 
namely, the imagination processing the idea at hand,20 “continue[s]” that idea, for 
example, of the violet.
In short, the imagination makes the idea that is [a] caused by what seems to be 
an uninterrupted and invariable sense perception but is actually [b] interrupted 
by the passage of time, uninterrupted by “continu[ing]” the idea that corresponds 
to the sense impression. Or as Hume puts it, immediately after the sentence cited 
above: “The passage from one moment to another is scarce felt, and distinguishes not 
itself by a different perception or idea, which may require a different direction of 
the spirits, in order to its conception” (T 1.4.2.33; SBN 203; my emphases). Thanks 
to the imagination’s power to “continue” an idea that is otherwise made discrete 
by the “passage from moment to moment,” the vulgar are given an idea of an ob-
ject that is both interrupted and invariable, and so, admits of “perfect identity.” In 
turn, we may conclude, contrary to most scholarly readings of T 1.4.2 (including, 
for instance, Price21), that thanks to the imagination, the vulgar may entertain an 
idea that is both invariable and uninterrupted, and so, in the end, does admit of a 
perfect identity. Why else would Hume refer to the vulgar as “viewing [an] object 
which preserves a perfect identity” (T 1.4.2.33; SBN 203)?
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This means that Hume is actually operating with three kinds of uninterrupted-
ness when it comes to his presentation of the vulgar idea of perfect identity: [i] An 
impression that, at least on the face of it, seems uninterrupted, for example, the 
uninterrupted violet impression. [ii] As Hume puts it, the “uninterrupted passage 
of the imagination from one idea to another” (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 203; my emphases). 
[iii] The uninterrupted violet idea of the impression, “which [thanks to the ‘unin-
terrupted passage of the imagination’] subsists without variation or interruption” 
(T 1.4.2.33; SBN 203), and so, admits of perfect identity.
However, the implication is—for Hume is not entirely explicit in this regard—
that this instance of perfect identity proves to be such a limited case, it does not 
give the vulgar any kind of comprehensive sense of objects that are both invariable 
and uninterrupted.22 Rather, our impressions seem to be constantly changing in 
light of the fact that we seem to be constantly moving through the world—we 
don’t “fix our thought” very often. We may conclude then, that according to 
Hume, the vulgar notion of perfect identity provides the vulgar with a standard 
of identity that legitimately applies to only a very limited number of cases, but 
is, nevertheless, mistakenly applied to the bulk of their experience by way of the 
disposition that it causes.23 This is the case simply because as noted in section 4.1.1 
of this paper, the disposition caused by the idea of perfect identity is very similar 
to, if not the same as, the disposition that is caused when we apprehend a set of 
resembling perceptions.
4.1.3 The Conflation: Vulgar Perspective I Continued
Having established a benchmark case for vulgarly-conceived-of “perfect identity,” 
where, as just noted, three kinds of uninterruptedness obtain, Hume immediately 
claims that sets of successive and resembling perceptions “place” (T 1.4.2.34; 
SBN 203) us in dispositions that are (Rd) similar, if not in fact the same as, those 
dispositions that occur in cases of vulgarly-conceived-of perfect identity: “a suc-
cession of related objects places the mind in this disposition, and is consider’d with 
the same smooth and uninterrupted progress of the imagination, as attends the 
view of the same [uninterrupted24 and] invariable object” (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 204; 
my emphasis). As a result, we are—when in a vulgar state of mind—prompted to 
“confound” (T 1.4.2.33–4, SBN 203–4) ideas that admit of vulgarly-conceived-of 
perfect identity with such sets of resembling, successive, and, crucial to note, 
interrupted perceptions.
In particular, when we experience a successive, interrupted series of similar 
perceptions (e.g., a series of resembling motorcycle perceptions) while in a vulgar 
state of mind, we are, Hume claims, naturally placed in a disposition that prompts 
us to conceive of these perceptions with “the same smooth and uninterrupted 
progress of the imagination, as attends the view of the same [uninterrupted, and] 
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invariable object” (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 204; my emphasis). As a result, these collec-
tions of resembling and successive perceptions are capable of putting us in a state 
of mind—a disposition—where, as is exactly the case with perfect identity, the 
imagination, “considers” (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 203) these ideas in a decisively unin-
terrupted fashion. As a result, thanks to the imagination, a series of interrupted, 
resembling perceptions (e.g., our set of motorcycle perceptions) are “consider[ed]” 
in an uninterrupted way (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 204).
And so, although Hume is not as explicit as he could be in this regard, we 
might say that the “uninterruptedness” of the disposition (i.e., the way in which 
the imagination conceives of this set of interrupted, resembling perceptions) 
seems to be transposed onto the set, making us conceive of it as uninterrupted. 
This means that our “view” of the set of interrupted, successive and resembling 
motorcycle perceptions is “attended” with the “same smooth and uninterrupted 
progress of the imagination” that “attends” our idea of say, the violet, when we 
“fix” our attention on it. For just as the interruptions of time seem to be erased by 
the uninterrupted imagination in the case of vulgarly-conceived-of perfect iden-
tity, the interruptions in perceiving the impressions at hand (e.g., looking away 
from the motorcycle and looking back) are erased by the uninterrupted imagina-
tion. As a result, cases where we “fix our thought” and cases where we apprehend 
a series of similar, but interrupted perceptions put us into very similar, if not the 
(Rd) same dispositions. We are put into a state of mind where the imagination is 
prone to “smooth over” any interruptions. So, we might say that experiencing a 
series of interrupted, resembling perceptions feels just like “fix[ing]” our thought 
on a single uninterrupted impression.
As a further result, when in a disposition caused by a set of resembling, inter-
rupted perceptions (e.g., the motorcycle perceptions) we mistakenly think that it 
must have been caused by an idea of perfect identity due to its striking (Re) resem-
blance to those dispositions caused when we “fix our thought” (recall figure 1). 
Accordingly Hume explains, as noted above, what we ultimately do in such vulgar 
states of mind is “confound” the two distinct although (Re) similar causes (that is, 
an idea of perfect identity and a set of resembling perceptions) of the same (Rd) 
effect (a disposition where the imagination “considers” the ideas at hand in an 
uninterrupted fashion) with each other. And so, Hume writes:
as the continuation of the same action is the effect of the continu’d view 
of the same25 object, ‘tis for this reason we attribute sameness to every 
succession of the related objects. The thought slides along the succes-
sion with equal facility, as if it consider’d only one object; and therefore 
confounds the succession with the [perfect] identity. (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 
204; my emphases)
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That is, as I already suggested in my general overview of dispositions, we mistak-
enly identity two sufficient causes of a given effect with each other. Analogously, I 
might hastily conclude that because my computer may be turned off by either a) 
following the proper shut-down procedure or, alternatively, b) yanking the plug 
out of the wall, that therefore, following the proper shut-down procedure and 
yanking the plug out of the wall are identical procedures.26
However, this vulgar confusion between sufficient causes of similar effects, 
inspired by the projection of the imagination’s “uninterruptedness” onto the set of 
successive, resembling perceptions, does not provide the vulgar with a lasting sense 
of perfect identity. And so, what I refer to as vulgar perspective I falls apart—but 
at the hands of the vulgar themselves. For, as we will see in a moment, the vulgar 
realize with just a small amount of reflection, that such “uninterruptedness” cannot 
be applied to sets of Rp resembling interrupted perceptions. Indeed, they realize 
that it is a contradiction to think of this set as both interrupted and uninterrupted. 
Concomitantly, the vulgar tendency to “confound” sets of resembling interrupted 
perceptions with ideas of perfect identity in virtue of the similar effects they have 
on the mind is effectively cut short. As a result, the vulgar make a somewhat des-
perate move to come up with another, seemingly more applicable notion of perfect 
identity—one that does not just apply to those rare situations where we “fix our 
thought.” In particular, they adopt what I call vulgar perspective II.
However, we should realize that Hume ends his account of vulgar perspec-
tive I by reminding the reader that none of us is immune to making this kind of 
mistake. We are all, at one point or another, compelled to apprehend the world 
in a decisively “unthinking” manner (T 1.4.2.36; SBN 205).
5. Why the Vulgar ascribe a continued existence to Broken 
appearances. an attempt to introduce Uninteruptedness by way of 
Reason: Vulgar Perspective ii
5.1. The Transition from Vulgar Perspective I to Vulgar Perspective II
As explained above, at one point or another we all naturally (albeit mistakenly) 
“ascribe . . . a perfect identity” (T 1.4.2.36; SBN 205) to sets of resembling, inter-
rupted perceptions. In particular, thanks to the influence of imagination-inspired 
dispositions, we tend to “confound” the idea of perfect identity with that of a set of 
resembling perceptions. Yet, if we proceed to reflect just a bit about this identifica-
tion—while in a vulgar state of mind—we are led to an inevitable contradiction. 
For how, despite how our dispositions compel us, could a set of interrupted percep-
tions simultaneously be an uninterrupted thing, a “body” (T 1.4.2.36; SBN 205)? 
Note how Hume puts this phenomenon, where the following passage comprises 
his lead-in to part 3 of his 4-part system, and so effectively signals, I think, a clear 
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break from his discussion of vulgar perspective I and his transition into vulgar 
perspective II27 (a transition that is widely overlooked in Hume scholarship).28
[According to the vulgar] [t]he very image, which is present to the senses, 
is with us the real body; and ’tis to these interrupted images we ascribe 
a perfect identity. But as the interruption of the appearance seems 
contrary to the identity, and naturally leads us to regard these resembling 
perceptions as different from each other, we here find ourselves at a loss 
how to reconcile such opposite opinions. The smooth passage of the 
imagination along the ideas of resembling perceptions makes us ascribe 
to them a perfect identity. The interrupted manner of their appearance 
makes us consider them as so many resembling, but still distinct beings, 
which appear after certain intervals. The perplexity arising from this con-
tradiction produces a propension to unite these broken appearances by the 
fiction of a continu’d existence, which is the third part of the hypothesis I 
propos’d to explain. (T 1.4.2.36; SBN 205; my emphases)
In light of this contradiction, Hume explains, the vulgar are driven to try again, but, 
crucially, with a different approach. This second approach, consisting of what I call 
vulgar perspective II, does not turn on the ability of the imagination to “smooth 
over” interruptions, nor relatedly, dispositions and the confusion that inevitably 
occurs regarding their origins. Rather, as a direct result of vulgar perspective I, a 
new propensity arises, consisting of the construction of “the fiction of a continu’d 
existence.” Hume’s discussion of this “propensity” comprises part 3 of his system, 
to which we now turn.
Here, Hume gives still another account of the transition from vulgar perspec-
tive I to vulgar perspective II, which initially proceeds as follows:
Now there being here an opposition betwixt the notion of the identity 
of resembling perceptions, and the interruption of their appearance, the 
mind must be uneasy in that situation, and will naturally seek relief from 
the uneasiness. Since the uneasiness arises from the opposition of two 
contrary principles, it must look for relief by sacrificing the one for the 
other. But as the smooth passage of our thought along our resembling 
perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we can never without 
reluctance yield up that opinion. (T 1.4.2.37; SBN 206; my emphases)
That is: [1] The vulgar have a clear contradiction on their hands, putting them in a 
very uncomfortable state. This contradiction is: a) our impressions are interrupted 
and b) our impressions are not interrupted. As noted above, this contradiction is a 
consequence of the vulgar inability to distinguish between perceptions and objects. 
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[2] It seems that the vulgar’s problem would be over if they simply rejected either 
a) or b), or, of course, overcame their inability to distinguish between objects and 
impressions. But this is not what happens.
Rather, Hume immediately continues:
We [while in this vulgar quandary] must therefore, turn to the other 
side, and suppose that our perceptions are no longer interrupted [my 
emphasis], but [instead] preserve a continu’d as well as an invariable exis-
tence [my emphasis], and are by that means entirely the same. But here 
the interruptions in the appearance of these perceptions are so long and 
frequent, that ‘tis impossible to overlook them; and as the appearance of 
a perception in the mind and its existence seem at first sight entirely the 
same, it may be doubted, whether we can ever assent to so palpable a 
contradiction, and suppose a perception to exist without being present to the 
mind [my emphasis]. (T 1.4.2.37; SBN 206)
That is, picking up where we left off above: [3] Although the vulgar are extremely 
reluctant to turn their backs on the seductive influence of dispositions, they can’t 
deny that their perceptions are nevertheless, interrupted. [4] Thus, when faced 
with a very uncomfortable contradiction, the vulgar are forced to come up with a 
new idea, but without surmounting their inability to distinguish between impres-
sions and objects. This means that at this point in their thought, the vulgar are 
not only engaged in reflexive thought, but reflective thought as well. On the one 
hand they continue to unthinkingly conflate their perceptions with objects. Yet 
on the other hand, upon reflection, they realize that they have a contradiction 
on their hands and so, they come up with the idea that impressions may exist 
independently of our sensing them.
But this new idea does seem rather absurd: “and as the appearance of a percep-
tion in the mind and its existence seem at first sight entirely the same it may be 
doubted, whether we can ever assent to so palpable a contradiction, and suppose 
a perception to exist without being present to the mind.” However, before we can care-
fully examine how Hume explains how the vulgar could possibly entertain the 
idea that a perception (namely, an impression) could exist without being perceived 
on T 1.4.2.37–40 (SBN 205–8), we should first note two other instances in Book 1 
where Hume gives separate, although brief accounts of the transition from vul-
gar perspective I to vulgar perspective II. The first is given just before he begins to 
discuss his 4-part system in T 1.4.2:
When we [in a vulgar state of mind] have been accustom’d to observe a 
constancy in certain impressions, and have found, that the perception 
of the sun or ocean, for instance, returns upon us after an absence or  
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annihilation with like parts and in a like order, as at its first appearance, 
we are not apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as different (which 
they really are) but on the contrary consider them as individually the 
same upon account of their resemblance. But as this interruption of their 
existence is contrary to their perfect identity, and makes us regard the 
first impression as annihilated, and the second as newly created, we find 
ourselves somewhat at a loss, and are involv’d in a kind of contradiction. In 
order to free ourselves from this difficulty, we disguise, as much as pos-
sible, the interruption, or rather remove it entirely, by supposing that 
these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which 
we are insensible. (T 1.4.2.24; SBN199; my emphases)
Later, Hume gives another summary of the vulgar perspective in 1.4.6, in the 
context of his discussion of personal identity:
However at one instant we may consider the related succession as variable 
or interrupted, we are sure the next to ascribe to it a perfect identity, 
and regard it as invariable and interrupted. Our propensity to this mistake 
is so great from the resemblance above-mention’d, that we fall into it be-
fore we are aware; and tho’ we incessantly correct ourselves by reflexion, 
and return to a more accurate method of thinking, yet we cannot long 
sustain our philosophy, or take off this biass from the imagination. Our 
last resource is to yield to it, and boldly assert that these different related 
objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and variable. In order 
to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often feign some new and un-
intelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents 
their interruption or variation. Thus, we feign the continu’d existence 
of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption (T 1.4.6.6; 
SBN 254; my emphases)
Thus, entirely consistently with what we saw to be the case with the summary of 
the vulgar perspective presented on T 1.4.2.36 (SBN 205), T 1.4.2.37 (SBN 206), 
as well as T 1.4.2.24 (SBN 199), the vulgar are forced to come up with the idea of 
an unperceived, continuous sensation, which Hume clearly states here, is “new.” As 
a result, it is not to be confused with the vulgar’s first, more impulsive ascription 
of perfect identity to sets of resembling perceptions, although this new perspec-
tive certainly seems to emerge from vulgar perspective I, if only to alleviate the 
contradiction it generates.
With these four passages in mind, it now becomes clearer, I think, why Hume 
dedicated part 2 of his system to a discussion of the vulgar perspective derivative 
of certain dispositions, while he devotes part 3 to a discussion of the vulgar idea 
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that continuous, unperceived impressions exist. Moreover, we need to constantly 
remind ourselves that although these are two distinct approaches, both must be 
seen as attempts—reflective or not—to grasp objects qua sense impressions as both 
invariable and uninterrupted, or in other words, as admitting of perfect identity. 
And these attempts are both the result of the vulgar inability to distinguish between 
perceptions and objects.
5.2 Unperceived Impressions: Vulgar Perspective II
With these summaries of the transition from vulgar perspective I to vulgar per-
spective II in mind, let us now return to our explication of part 3 of Hume’s 4-part 
system in T 1.4.2.36–40 (SBN 205–8). Immediately after his summary of what I 
characterize as the transition from vulgar perspective I to vulgar perspective II on 
SBN 206, Hume proceeds to explain how the vulgar could possibly entertain the 
idea that although our impressions may be interrupted in that we are not always 
perceiving them, this “not-perceiving-them” does not necessarily imply that simul-
taneously, they do not exist. For on the face of it, this claim might seem absurd. 
What ordinary (i.e., “vulgar”) person would think that a sense impression exists 
without actually sensing it? In fact, this seems like an obvious contradiction in 
terms. In what appears to be a move to obviate the absurdity of this perspective, 
Hume momentarily steps out of his explication of explaining how the vulgar might 
justify their perspective. In its stead, he explains why, according to his non-vulgar 
perspective (particularly, according to his own theory of mind) the vulgar’s new 
supposition is not entirely absurd (T 1.4.2.37; SBN 206).
In particular, Hume invokes the idea that the mind is a “heap or collections 
of different perceptions” (T 1.4.2.39; SBN 207), a position that we find discussed 
at length in T 1.4.6 in the context of his account of personal identity. We may 
conclude as much, because i) Hume explicitly refers to T 1.4.6 in regard to his 
discussion of an unperceived perception (see footnote 1, T 1.4.2.37; SBN 206), and 
ii) Hume could not be paraphrasing the vulgar perspective here, if only because 
according to Hume, the vulgar think that the self/mind is simple and indivisible 
(see T 1.4.6, particularly, T 1.4.6.6). Yet here, Hume explicitly refers to the mind as 
a “heap or collection of different perceptions” (T 1.4.2.39; SBN 207).29
In an effort to make his account of this second, more reflective vulgar approach 
to objects more plausible, Hume proceeds to ask two questions. These questions 
may be paraphrased as follows: [a] How is it the case that the vulgar could pos-
sibly assume that a sense impression has a continu’d existence? [b] Assume that 
an object is a collection of resembling sense-impressions, P1–Pn. What happens 
when we stop perceiving an object, then perceive it again, where in the latter case 
we would generate a new resembling sense impression, namely, Pn + 1? Does doing 
this cause the object to grow (T 1.4.2.38; SBN 207)?30
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Hume answers the first question by telling us, in so many words that the 
“mind” is nothing but a “heap or collection of different perceptions” (T 1.4.2.39; 
SBN 207). As a result, “the mind” has no genuine “simplicity and identity” (T 
1.4.2.39; SBN 207), although we mistakenly attribute it with both. Rather, each 
perception exists independently of the heap, although when put together, they 
compose the heap. Consequently, just as we could, say, take one apple from a 
“heap or collection of different” apples and say that such an apple continues to 
exist on its own, we may separate a sense-impression from that “heap or collection 
of different perceptions” that constitutes the mind. Analogously, this separated 
sense-impression would, it seems, continue to exist on its own; it does not need to 
be a part of the heap to exist. Thus, in regard to the vulgar supposition that sense 
impressions must continue to exist when we are not sensing them, he writes: 
“there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that 
is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which 
constitute a thinking being” (T 1.4.2.39; SBN 207). In this respect, the vulgar (qua 
Hume’s theory of mind) may entertain the idea that a sense impression continues 
to exist without being perceived, while Hume may avoid being accused of setting 
up a straw-man.31
To answer question [b] regarding how an object can consist of a non-fixed col-
lection of sense impressions, Hume explains that it is not contradictory (thanks 
to the answer given to question [a] above) to conclude that sense impressions 
exist independently of being perceived. Thus, if we identify objects with sense 
impressions, it is not contradictory to claim that objects exist independently of 
the mind. As a result, when such externally existing perceptions interact with 
our minds—where our minds are nothing but heaps of perceptions—new sense 
impressions become present to the mind. However, they are, evidently, added to 
the “heap” and not to the object itself. As a result, the object/impression does not 
grow with each new impression of it (T 1.4.2.40; SBN 207).
Thus, Hume concludes on behalf of the vulgar in terms of their second 
perspective:
[According to the vulgar,] [t]he same continu’d and uninterrupted Being 
[i.e., an unperceived impression] may, therefore, be sometimes present 
to the mind, and sometimes absent from it, without any real or essential 
change in the Being itself. An interrupted appearance of the senses implies 
not necessarily an interruption in the existence. [Thus, according to this 
more advanced vulgar line of thought], [t]he supposition of the continu’d 
existence of sensible objects or perceptions involves no contradiction. We 
may easily indulge our inclination to that supposition. When the exact 
resemblance of our perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we 
may remove the seeming interruption by feigning a continu’d being, 
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which may fill those intervals, and preserve a perfect and entire identity 
to our perceptions. (T 1.4.2.40; SBN 208)
Here Hume clearly explains that the vulgar do not posit—contrary to at least 
Price’s, Bennett’s and Collier’s32 reading—particular impressions in series P1–Pn, 
say P5 and P7, where P5 and P7 were never actually perceived. Rather, according to 
Hume, the vulgar appear to posit one continuous and uninterrupted impression in 
the case of each respective “object” at hand. In other words, they posit “[t]he same 
and continu’d Being” (my emphases). This “Being” continues to exist even we are 
not perceiving it, and in that respect, it “may fill in those intervals” when we are 
not perceiving it. For instance, if, in the spirit of vulgar perspective II, I posit the 
existence of a continuous and uninterrupted impression of say, an apple, because 
it allegedly exists when I am not perceiving it, it may, as an entity that resembles 
all my impressions of it, “fill in” any “intervals” (e.g., P5 and P7) when I am not 
actually having specific apple-impressions.33 As such, it seems that the vulgar, 
adopting this “new” (T 1.4.6.6; SBN 254) perspective, come up with a notion of 
an object that is i) a sense impression, and ii) is not only invariable, but also, is 
uninterrupted, that is, is continuous.
However, despite their best efforts, with just a bit more reflection—that is, 
philosophical reflection—vulgar perspective II may also be shown to contradict 
itself in the form of a second reductio, although space does not allow for a discussion 
of that matter here. However, at this point, I do think that we can safely conclude 
that 1) Hume does not embrace the vulgar perspective as his own position, regard-
less of what we may take to be Hume’s position to be; 2) Hume splits the vulgar 
perspective into two parts in “Of Skepticism with regard to the senses,” where, 
although the first evolves into the second by way of a reductio, each consists of 
a distinct attempt to make what certainly seems to be interrupted—that is sense 
impressions—uninterrupted; and 3) To properly understand Hume’s account of 
the vulgar perspective, we must pay particular attention to the divisions that he 
makes in his 4-part system, particularly, the distinctions he makes between parts 
2 and 3, where in part 2, we must focus on Hume’s notion of a “disposition” and 
“perfect identity,” and in part 3, on the notion of an “uninterrupted Being.”
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and cited by page number, and David Hume, A Treatise of Hume Nature, ed. David 
Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), referred 
to as “T” and cited by Book, part, section, and paragraph number.
3 Kemp Smith does, very briefly, explicate steps 1–4 of Hume’s system. Nor-
man Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its Origins and 
Central Doctrines (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 474–87. However, in the course of 
doing so, he does not clearly distinguish between Hume’s position and the vulgar 
perspective.
4 We examine perfect identity at length in section 4.1.2 of this paper.
5 Note—for reasons that are not relevant to our present discussion—that 
Hume has occasion to include externality and independence under the category 
of distinctness (T 1.4.2.2; SBN 188). As result, on occasion, “distinct” must be read 
as being elliptical for “distinct,” “external,” and “independent.” See, for instance, 
T 1.4.2.2 (SBN 188) and T 1.4.2.11 (SBN 192).
6 Throughout Book 1, Hume uses the properties of continuity and distinct-
ness interchangeably with the property of uninterruptedness. This is the case because 
if an object is conceived of as uninterrupted, then it is, by definition, conceived of 
as continuous and so (see [1] above) as distinct. The reverse is also true: if an object 
is conceived of as distinct, it is conceived of as continuous, and so, by definition, 
it is conceived of as uninterrupted. Note however, that Hume does not think that 
invariability implies uninterruptedness, although it might be argued that he seems 
to assume that uninterruptedness implies invariability, and so, a continuous and 
distinct object, which as such, is also uninterrupted, is also invariable. Regardless, 
the fact that invariability does not imply uninterruptedness might explain why 
Hume moves from a discussion of continuity and distinctness to a discussion 
of invariability and uninterruptedness in his four-part system. For as will be ex-
plained in detail in sections 3–5 above, the vulgar may only entertain the idea of 
an invariable object, but not an invariable AND uninterrupted (i.e., continuous 
and distinct) object. As a result, to discuss the vulgar perspective in parts 2 and 3 
of his system, he must explicitly introduce the property of invariability.
7 Unfortunately, space does not permit a discussion of the philosophical 
position here, particularly, how it relates to the vulgar position.
8 There is a flaw with the vulgar theory presented on T 1.4.2.31 (SBN 202) 
that Hume does not point out until T 1.4.2.43 (SBN 209–10). One could not, ac-
cording to Hume, compare a set of resembling sense impressions if all were not 
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immediately present to the senses. For, keep in mind that according to Hume, we do 
not remember sense impressions, but instead, ideas of sense impressions (see at least 
T 1.1.1–3). As a result, in the course of his explanation of the vulgar perspective, 
Hume implicitly assumes (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203) and then somewhat explicitly states 
(T 1.4.2; SBN 209–10), that although the vulgar think that they are identifying 
sense impressions, they are actually relating either a set of ideas with each other 
or are relating a set of ideas with a current sense impression or impressions. For 
instance, I might relate all of my memories of my impressions of a motorcycle with 
my current sense impressions of the motorcycle, and then proceed to mistakenly 
identify this set of ideas and impressions with the “object” motorcycle. Oddly 
enough, commentators have tended to overlook this somewhat fundamental 
detail. See for example, H. H. Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1940), 33–44: “Let us now try to state Hume’s meaning 
more clearly. As before, we must describe the situation entirely in terms of impres-
sions. . . . [H]ere again we find that there is an interrupted series of impressions, a 
series with a gap in it” (35; my emphasis). However, some might argue that what 
we remember is having had impressions that resembled one another, and it is to 
those impressions that we remember having had that we attribute continuity. In 
response, I would have to say that I agree, but regardless, a memory of an impres-
sion is an idea (namely, an idea of an impression, as opposed to an idea of an idea; 
cf. T 1.3.8.15–7 (SBN 105).
9 However, some reflection is clearly involved in what I call vulgar perspec-
tive II. But this reflection does not concern the vulgar’s seemingly instinctive 
inability to distinguish between objects and impressions. Rather, it concerns their 
attempt to alleviate the contradiction that results from this inability. See section 
5 above for more detail.
10 Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World; Jonathan Bennett, Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Barry 
Stroud, Hume (London and New York: Routledge, 1977); Fred Wilson, “Is Hume a 
Skeptic with Regard to the Senses?” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27.1 (1989): 
49–73, Marjorie Grene, “The Objects of Hume’s Treatise,” Hume Studies 20.2 
(1994):163–77, Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume; Eric Steinberg, “Hume 
on the Continued Existence and the Identity of Changing Things,” Hume Studies 
7 (1981):105–20.
11 Stroud however, does mention dispositions, but only in passing (103), as 
does Kemp Smith (477–8) and D. F. and M. J. Norton in their annotations to the 
Treatise (476). Moreover, all four mention dispositions without, I think, making 
it absolutely clear that Hume is speaking for the vulgar here and not himself.
12 To be precise, we should note that initially, Hume tells us that he is look-
ing for dispositions that are either similar or the same as those caused by ideas of 
perfect identity: “not only [does the relation of resemblance cause] an association 
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of ideas, but also of dispositions, and makes us conceive the one idea by an act 
or operation of the mind, similar to that by which we conceive the other. This 
circumstance I have observ’d to be of great moment; and we may establish it for 
a general rule, that whatever ideas place the mind in the same disposition or in 
similar ones are very apt to be confounded” (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203; my emphases). 
However, shortly after this passage, he seems to restrict his discussion to disposi-
tions that are not just similar, but in fact, are the same: “Now what other objects, 
besides identical ones [namely, ones that admit of perfect identity], are capable of 
placing the mind in the same disposition, when it considers them, and of causing 
the same uninterrupted passage of the imagination from one idea to another?” 
(T 1.4.2.34; SBN 203; my emphasis). And finally, in his last remark regarding 
dispositions at this juncture in the Treatise, he retreats to characterizing them 
as almost the same, and so it would seem, as merely similar: “An easy transition 
or passage of the imagination, along the ideas of these different and interrupted 
perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider 
one constant and uninterrupted perception [namely, a perception that enables us 
to think of an idea as admitting of a perfect identity ]” (T 1.4.2.35; SBN 204; my 
emphasis, cf. above, section 4.1.2). However, although I think that we should, at 
least, be aware of Hume’s oscillation on this point, I don’t think it substantively 
affects his position regarding the distinction between what I call vulgar perspec-
tive I versus vulgar perspective II. As a result, we need not pursue its implications 
any further here.
13 We examine “perfect identity” at length in the next section.
14 Where here, Hume appears to be using “ideas” quite loosely. For given the 
context of this sentence, it could mean a set of resembling perceptions (which, as 
explained in footnote 8, could entail impressions and ideas), or it could mean an 
idea of an object that admits of “perfect identity.”
15 The reader need only survey the most extensive and most well-known 
accounts of T 1.4.2 to see that this is the case, for example, Price, Hume’s Theory 
of the External World, Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, Bennett, Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume, and Stroud, Hume. Nor can I find an extensive account of perfect 
identity elsewhere.
16 As noted earlier, Hume warned us that he might, after the vulgar, use 
the word “object” interchangeably with the word “perception.” (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 
202). Here is a case where he seems to be doing so. For as explained in section 
4.1.1 of this paper, Hume is clear that sets of resembling perceptions cause dispo-
sitions that are similar to, if not the same as, dispositions caused by the ideas of 
perfect identity. So, in both cases, perceptions cause these dispositions, not mind- 
independent “objects,” as Hume seems to imply in the passage noted above. But 
it may have just been easier for Hume to use the word “object” here—in the spirit 
of the vulgar—however misleading it might be.
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17 Keep in mind that Hume is using the word “object” here interchangeably 
with “perception.”
18 Again, Hume seems to be using the word “object” interchangeably with 
the word “perception” here—for at no point does he suggest that the vulgar may 
somehow apprehend mind-independent “objects” such that they may “fix” their 
thoughts on them. Rather, the implication is that the vulgar simply focus on one 
kind of impression for an extended period of time, e.g., a violet impression, without 
entertaining any interruptions, e.g., looking away, at say, a chair. This point brings 
to mind the “act/object” distinction in Hume, where the question is: Are impres-
sions mental “states” or are they “objects” of mental states (see for instance Stroud, 
Hume, J.P. Wright, The Skeptical Realism of David Hume (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1983), Grene, “The Objects of Hume’s Treatise” and Don Garrett, 
Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). Although we don’t have space to address this problem in 
regard to all of the Treatise here, or even in regard to all of T 1.4.2, we might note 
that in the passages cited above, Hume does seem to indicate that perceptions are 
objects. Certain dispositions (states of mind) survey resembling objects, where, as 
I have explained throughout, these “objects” are perceptions. One might argue 
that this usage is just an artifact of his attempt to adopt the vulgar position (where 
he uses the word “object” interchangeably with “perception”). However, in this 
case, although perceptions are not mind-independent things, they are discrete, 
interrupted “things” that are “surveyed” by the mind. In this very general respect, 
perceptions appear to be objects of the mind rather than being states of mind. 
However, it could be argued that regardless, they are discrete experiences that, as 
such, are the “objects” of dispositions. And so, in this case, generally speaking, 
perceptions would be states of mind and objects. However, further discussion of 
this matter takes us well beyond the scope of this paper.
19 Earlier in T 1.4.2 Hume claims that we do not have an impression of con-
tinuity, i.e., uninterruptedness (T 1.4.2.11–2; SBN 192–5). He does not go back on 
this claim here.
20 Although Hume is not entirely explicit in this regard, we may conclude 
that by “faculties of mind,” he is referring to the imagination simply because in the 
next paragraph (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 203–4), he explicitly tells us that the imagination 
is responsible for moving in an uninterrupted passage from one idea to another 
as time passes. And so, he is implicitly identifying the “faculties” that “continue” 
the idea at hand with the imagination: “Now what other objects, besides identical 
ones, are capable of placing the mind in the same disposition, when it considers 
them, and causing the same uninterrupted passage of the imagination from one 
idea to another?” (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 203) See also section 4.1.3 of this paper, where 
I discuss this line in more detail.
21 Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, 46–7.
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22 But what other instances of perfect identity are there? Answering this 
question takes us well beyond the scope of this paper, but the reader might con-
sider cases where we imagine a “medium betwixt unity [uninterruptedness] and 
number [invariability]” (T 1.4.2.29; SBN 201). In fact, it may be argued that in part 
I of Hume’s 4-part system, he presents an alternative account of perfect identity; 
noting, however, that he does not always refer to such identity as “perfect,” but 
as identity, simpliciter (e.g., T 1.4.2.29; SBN 201).
23 At least initially, for as shown in section 5 of this paper, the vulgar 
ultimately abandon this approach and engage in what I characterize as vulgar 
perspective II.
24 Hume uses the word “same” interchangeably with the word “uninter-
rupted” here. We may conclude that this is the case because previous to this 
passage, he compares dispositions caused by ideas of perfect identity with dis-
positions caused by sets of resembling, successive and interrupted perceptions. 
Concomitantly, given our definition of “perfect identity,” he is comparing dis-
positions caused by ideas of objects that are both uninterrupted and invariable, 
with dispositions caused by ideas of objects that are merely invariable. In the 
passage noted above, he is, as explained above, still comparing these two kinds 
of dispositions. As a result, it simply follows that the comparison he makes here 
must be between an idea that is invariable and uninterrupted (and so, admits of 
perfect identity) with a set of interrupted, resembling and successive perceptions. 
Thus, when he refers to the object in the passage cited above as the “same invari-
able object,” he must have meant the “[uninterrupted and] invariable object;” 
namely, the idea of an object with a perfect identity. Note that for similar reasons, 
Hume also uses “same” to mean “uninterrupted” on T 1.4.2.34 (SBN 204), which 
is cited and explained above.
25 As noted in footnote 24, here is another instance where Hume uses “same” 
(as well as, in this case, “sameness”) interchangeably with “uninterrupted.”
26 Or, as Hume puts it: “We find by experience, that there is such a constancy 
[namely, a resemblance] in almost all the impressions of the senses, that their 
interruption produces no alteration on them, and hinders them not from return-
ing the same in appearance and in situation as at their first existence. I survey the 
furniture in chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new 
perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This [Rp] 
resemblance is observ’d in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together 
our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation, and conveys 
the mind with an easy transition from one to another. An easy transition or passage of 
the imagination, along with the ideas of these different and interrupted perceptions, is 
almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider one constant and 
uninterrupted perception. ’Tis therefore very natural for us to mistake one for the 
other” (T 1.4.2.35; SBN 204; my emphases). Also recall that Hume makes a very 
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similar point just before he launches into his discussion of vulgarly-conceived-of 
perfect identity, as noted in section 4.1.1 of this paper: “This circumstance I have 
observ’d to be of great moment; and we may establish it for a general rule, that 
whatever ideas place the mind in the same disposition or in similar ones, are very 
apt to be confounded” (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203). And still elsewhere: “objects [that 
place us in the same uninterrupted disposition] are very naturally confounded 
with [perfectly] identical ones” (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 203).
27 To further support my claim that part 2 of Hume’s 4-part system is meant 
to be an explication of vulgar perspective I, while part 3 is an explication of vulgar 
perspective II, note that Hume initially explains the distinction between parts 
2 and 3 as follows: “Secondly, Give a reason, why the resemblance of our broken 
and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute an identity to them. Thirdly, 
Account for that propensity, which this illusion gives, to unite these broken 
appearances by a continu’d existence” (T 1.4.2.25; SBN 200). Notice that even ac-
cording to this very brief summary, it is clear that each part consists of a separate 
attempt to account for identity, where part 2 directly turns on “the resemblance 
of our broken and interrupted perceptions,” and part 3 explains a “propensity” 
that seems to fall out of the illusory content of the first attempt, particularly, the 
contradiction it generates. Moreover, if parts 2 and 3 were not meant to be separate 
accounts, why would Hume divide them as such?
28 However, Price does gesture towards this distinction between vulgar 
perspective I and vulgar perspective II, loosely identifying them as two “stages” 
in Hume’s account of identity (see Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, 49). 
But in the course of doing so, Price does not acknowledge that Hume is speak-
ing for the vulgar here, not himself. And so, Price does not distinguish between 
vulgar perspective I and vulgar perspective II, but instead, between two stages in 
Hume’s position on objects. Moreover, Price does not explicitly acknowledge the 
role of dispositions or perfect identity. Nor does he think that the unperceived 
perception that the vulgar are forced to posit in light of the contradiction that 
falls out of vulgar perspective I is a meant to be a continuous “Being” (see section 
5.2 above for more detail on this last problem). Kemp Smith also gestures towards 
this distinction in the course of his brief explanation of Hume’s four-part system 
(The Philosophy of David Hume, 474–87). However, he does not think that part 3 
of Hume’s system is an analysis of the vulgar point of view (479–81). Meanwhile, 
more recent scholarship seems to overlook the distinction between the two vulgar 
perspectives altogether.
29 I am grateful to Abe Roth for suggesting i) and ii) to me at a recent Hume 
conference.
30 Or, as Hume puts it: “When we are present [in a vulgar state of mind], we 
say we feel, or see it. Here then may arise two questions; First, How we can satisfy 
ourselves in supposing a perception to be absent from the mind without being 
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annihilated. Secondly, After what manner we conceive an object to become pres-
ent to the mind, without some new creation of a perception or image; and what 
we mean by this seeing, and feeling, and perceiving” (T 1.4.2.38; SBN 207).
31 Or, as Roth puts it: “[By invoking his own theory of mind] Hume can feel 
free to attribute to the vulgar a belief in perceptions unperceived, and not worry 
that he’s violating some principle of charity by attributing to them some obvi-
ous contradiction.” Abraham Roth, “Comments on “The Vulgar Conception of 
Objects in ‘Of Skepticism with regard to the Senses’,” presented at the 2005 Hume 
Conference, Toronto, Canada. But this is not say that Hume actually thinks that 
sense impressions do exist independently of being perceived (T 1.42.45; SBN 210–1). 
Rather, his point is, because it’s a logically possible idea, it is not entirely absurd.
32 See Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, Bennett, Locke, Berkeley and 
Hume: Central Themes, and Mark Collier, “Filling in the Gaps: Hume and Connec-
tionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects,” Hume Studies 25.1–2 
(1999): 155–70.
33 Cf. Wright, The Skeptical Realism of David Hume, 65–6, and Harold Noonan, 
Hume on Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 1999), 181, in support of the claim that 
(on behalf of the vulgar) Hume has a singular, not-necessarily-perceived impres-
sion in mind here. However, although Wright initially claims that indeed, such 
impressions are singular, and thus, constitute the whole object at hand, without 
explanation he suggests that such not-necessarily-perceived impressions are (in the 
spirit of Price et al.), particular “gap fillers.” Note: “[Hume] claims that the source 
of our belief in the unperceived and independent existence of our resembling 
impressions lies in our tendency to image (form an idea of) a single temporally 
continuous perception when what we actually sense (have an impression of) are 
two or more temporally discontinuous resembling perceptions. The natural pro-
pensity of the imagination leads us to think of our resembling impressions as one 
continuous appearance . . . through a kind of ‘confused reasoning’ we combine the 
contradictory perceptions of imagination and sense, and so judge the unperceived 
existence of our resembling impressions. We are then forced to think of them [my 
emphasis] as existing in the gap between their appearances” (66). 
